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Case No. 18211 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an action by the Plaintiff against the Defendant, 
United Farm Agency, Inc., a Utah corporation, for damages arising 
out of a real estate transaction. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried before the Honorable Boyd Bunnell on the 
29th and 30th day of July, 1981. The Court granted judgment in 
favor of the Plaintiff on July 30, 1981, against all of the defen-
dants except Linda McGarry and took under advisement the amount 
of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff. On September 4, 1981, 
the Court filed its Memorandum Decision (R. 213-215), and on 
October 14, 1981, the Court signed and filed its Findings of Fact, 
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Conclusions of Law and Judgment (R. 232-243). 
The Defendant, United Farm Agency, filed its Motion for a 
New Trial which was denied by the Court by its Order filed Decem-
ber 24, 1981 (R. 285). The notice of appeal was filed on January8, 
1982 (R. 304). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The Respondent requests that the trial court's decision be 
affirmed in all respects and that he be awarded his costs. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Plaintiff operated a construction business in Moab, Utah, 
from 1970 until he was defrauded of his business in 1978 (Tr. 242-
243). 
The Plaintiff's first dealings with United Farm Agency 
occurred in 1976 (Tr. 7). At that time, Mitch Williams, a United 
Farm Agency agent, approached the Plaintiff about purchasing the 
Grand Valley Motel and Silver Dollar office building, which had 
been listed with United Farm Agency. The purchase was consummated 
with the help of Robert Anderson, United Farm's local representative, 
and Anderson, in lieu of receiving a monetary commission from the 
seller, received free rent in an office the Plaintiff renovated 
in the Silver Dollar office building (Tr. 8, 133). 
SALE OF MOTEL AND OFFICE BUILDING 
The Plaintiff and Anderson had occasion to see each other 
on a day to day basis during the months that renovation of the 
office building occurred and a good relationship evolved between 
Robert Anderson and the Plaintiff (Tr. 9-10, 134). On June 14, 
1977, the Plaintiff listed the Grand Valley Motel and Silver Dollar 
office building with United Farm Agency through Anderson because 
-2-
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of his daily contact with Anderson and because Anderson had helped 
him draw up the papers when he bought the motel (Tr. 134-135; Ex. 2). 
On June 23, 1977, the Plaintiff listed the office building separ-
ately with United Farm Agency. Each listing was executed on a 
United Farm Agency form (Tr. 10-11; Ex. 2, 5). 
At the end of November, 1977, United Farm Agency and Ander-
son produced a prospective buyer for the Plaintiff's motel and 
office building. A Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale was 
signed by the propective buyer and the Plaintiff on a United Farm 
Agency form (Ex. 4). However, the sale failed to close and the 
earnest money was returned to the prospective buyer to the Plain-
tiff's displeasure (Tr. 12, 13, 411; Ex. 4). 
Other buyers for the motel and office building were subse-
quently introduced to the Plaintiff by Anderson and the parties 
entered into a Deposit Receipt and Agreement of Sale on a United 
Farm Agency form on March 27, 1978 (Ex. 10). The agreed price for 
the motel and office building was $200,000.00 with $2,000.00 earn-
est money placed by the buyers. Because the Plaintiff had re-
ceived no earnest money when the earlier sale fell through, the 
Plaintiff required that the $2,000.00 be released to him prior to 
closing in return for his property being tied up (Tr. 403-404, 411). 
The sale closed on May 8, 1978, and United Farm Agency received 
a $20,000.00 commission of which $10,000.00 went to Anderson (Tr. 19, 
20-21). Financing for the purchase of the motel was arranged 
through RLC, which Anderson testified is a parent or subsidiary 
corporation of United Farm Agency which provides financing for 
United Farm Agency transactions (T. 22-23; Ex. 10, 11, 12)~ 
-3-
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HOME AND CONSTRUCTION COMPANY LISTED 
In the meantime, back in January 1978, the Plaintiff had 
also listed his home and construction company with United Farm 
Agency through Anderson for a combined sales price of $275,000.00 
(Tr. 14-15; Ex. 6). Anderson had prepared letters on United Farm 
Agency's stationary to send to prospective buyers for the home 
and construction business, and the home and construction company 
were advertised in United Farm Agency's national listing service 
catalogue (Tr. 16~17, 24; Ex. 7-8). 
HOME SOLD 
A buyer for the home was found through United Farm Agency's 
national listing catalogue and the closing occurred on or about 
June 29, 1978. The home sold for $75,000.00 and United Farm 
Agency received a commission of $4,500.00, of which Anderson re-
ceived one-half (Tr. 25). As in the case of the sale of the motel 
and office building, the Plaintiff again required that the earnest 
money be released to pim early in return for his property being 
tied up and his request was again accommodated by the buyer, 
Anderson and the attorney handling the closing (Tr. 405, 411; 
Ex. 13). 
The construction company was re-listed for one year with 
United Farm Agency on June 23, 1978. The list price was lowered 
from the previous asking price of $200,000.00 to $185,000.00. 
Additionally, the business shop building was listed separately for 
$70,000.00 (Ex. 14, 15). The Plaintiff at this time advised 
Anderson that his company was having cash flow problems and that 
a prospective buyer should have $50,000.00 cash available to meet 
the monthly cash turn over. As with the prior listing, the Plain-
tiff agreed to remain with the company for six months in order to 
-4-
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provide a contractor's license and to assure the continuity and 
the good name of the business the Plaintiff had built (Tr. 30-32, 
141, 147, 279). Although the Plaintiff was having cash flow 
problems, his company had plenty of assets which could be liquidated 
to pay off debts (Tr. 289). 
PURCHASER FOR CONSTRUCTION COMPANY 
On July 17, 1978, Anderson expecting to receive a commission, 
presented to the Plaintiff as a prospective purchaser of the Plain-
tiff's construction company one James C. McGarry acting as presi-
dent of JCM Development Corporation. McGarry was represented by 
James Gleason, a real estate agent for J. G. Realty (Tr. 36-38, 41). 
Anderson, McGarry, Gleason and a Gerald (Bud) Stocks, who had in-
traduced McGarry and Gleason to Anderson, all examined some of the 
Plaintiff's jobs and equipment and then went to the Plaintiff's 
office where they reviewed the Plaintiff's business records (T. 40). 
The Plaintiff asked Anderson if JCM had the $50,000.00 liquidity 
necessary to maintain continued operations of his company and 
Anderson assured the Plaintiff that ''money was no problem with 
these people" and that the buyers were worth millions of dollars 
(Tr. 138, 141, 279). Anderson advised the Plaintiff that JCM was 
willing to pay $200,000.00 for his construction company (Tr. 235) 
and further advised the Plaintiff that he should not liquidate 
any assets to meet current obligations since the assets would be 
1 part of a sure sale to JCM (Tr. 287-288) . 
1Because of the Plaintiff's good credit, his bank honored 
checks even when his account temporarily had insufficient funds 
(Tr. 361,372). The Plaintiff's business had handled $714,000.00 
in contracts in 1977 (Tr. 293-294; Ex. 42). 
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On the morning of July 18, all of the parties, except 
Stocks, again met at the Plaintiff's office and examined more 
equipment and further examined the business records. Anderson at 
trial admitted that at this time he still expected United Farm 
Agency to received a commission in the event of sale (Tr. 41-42). 
Sale negotiations continued on and off throughout the 18th 
to late afernoon, Anderson negotiating on behalf of the Plaintiff 
and expecting to receive a commission. At 5:00 or 6:00 in the 
evening in a meeting at the United Farm Agency office, Anderson told 
the Plaintiff that McGarry and Gleason were satisfied with the in-
formation they had seen and were ready to make a deal (Tr. 144). 
By this time Anderson and United Farm Agency had also entered into 
their own deal with McGarry, unbeknown to the Plaintiff (Tr. 58, 
248). 2 The understanding reached between the Plaintiff and McGarry 
2Prior in the afternoon Anderson, for himself and for United 
Farm Agency, had signed an Earnest Money Agreement with McGarry 
wherein JCM agreed to purchase 20 acres of land owned jointly by 
Anderson and United Farm Agency for $100,000.00, which land was to 
be developed by JCM into a mobile home park by using the Plaintiff's 
construction company to do the construction work (Tr. 60, 63-64). 
It was further anticipated that United Farm Agency would exclusively 
list and sell the mobile home lots, and that United Farm Agency and 
Anderson would ultimately handle upwards of two million dollars in 
sales (Tr. 62, 64-66, 69). 
The acreage involved had been received by Anderson and United 
Farm Agency as a commission from a prior sale. With United Farm 
Agency's approval, the land had been mortgaged to First Security 
Bank on December 21, 1977 to secure a $25,000.00 loan taken by 
Anderson (Tr. 32-34, 61; Ex. 16-17). As of July 18, 1978, Anderson 
was several months delinquent in making the agreed payments and 
needed to find a buyer for the 20 acres to pay off the loan. JCM 
offered him the opportunity to pay off the loan and still have 
nearly $25,000.00 (the remainder of his $50,000.00 one-half of the 
purchase price) ,(Tr. 55-58). Anderson admitted that he was very 
much hopeful that JCM would purchase the 20 acres (Tr. 37). Also· 
by this time, McGarry, Gleason and Anderson had agreed that United 
Farm Agency's $20,000.00 commission from the Plaintiff's sale would 
be split with $5,000.00 to go to Anderson and, implicitly, $5,000.00 
-6-
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called for the Plaintiff to receive $200,000.00 for his business as 
previously listed, plus a 1.7 acre lot to be included which had not 
been listed (Ex. 18). 
ANDERSON "STEPS ASIDE" 
When it came time to reduce the understanding to writing 
Gleason called Anderson out of the presence of the Plaintiff and 
said his form was simpler and that Anderson should let him handle 
the sale. Gleason also stated that he intended to handle the 
closing as a stock transfer. Anderson stated that a stock trans-
fer was not the proper way to handle the sale and that the bulk 
sales act should be complied with. Gleason told Anderson to "step 
aside" and said, "I know how to handle this deal. Just let me 
handle it". Anderson then acquiesced, "Mainly because Gleason 
didn't want me to" (do the sale) and because of the prior deal 
worked out between JCM, United Farm Agency and Anderson which 
offered United Farm Agency and Anderson a potential two million 
dollars in real estate sal~s and lots of attractive possibilites 
for the future (Tr. 47-48, 69, 145, 256). 
When Gleason and Anderson rejoined the Plaintiff no explan-
ation was given by Anderson to the Plaintiff as to why a J. G. 
Realty form was being used (T. 51). When the Plaintiff asked what 
to United Farm Agency and $10,000.00 to J. G. Realty (Tr. 44, 145, 
161. 
While the Plaintiff later learned that Anderson and United 
Farm Agency had made a deal with JCM, he was never told by Anderson 
of the delinquent note (Tr. 116-117, 155-156). After the Plain-
tiff's company was turned over to JCM an article appeared in the 
August 24, 1978 Moab Times Independent announcing that a mobile 
home subdivision was to be developed by JCM with lots to be sold and 
financed by United Farm Agency. The article also stated that the 
Plaintiff's construction company would be used to develop the sub-
division. (Tr. 64-66, 110). 
-7-
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was happening Anderson told him that there was to be a commission 
split between brokers with Anderson to receive $5,000.00 of the 
$20,000.00 commission (Tr. 145-146, 44). 
UNITED FARM AGENCY'S POSITION 
At trial Anderson, Clan Stilson (the United Farm Agency broker), 
and United Farm all took the position that Anderson had expressed 
concern over the need to comply with the bulk sales act in the 
PLaintiff's presence although Anderson admitted that the Plaintiff 
"may or may not have been present" when the discussion occurred. 
The Plaintiff denied being present (T. 47, 49, 256). Anderson, 
Stilson and United Farm further contended that once the parties 
seemed intent on proceeding contrary to Anderson's advice, Anderson 
determined that he was no longer going to represent the Plaintiff 
and from that point on United Farm Agency no longer expected to 
receive a commission (although a $20,000.00 commission appeared 
when the closing instruments were prepared by Anderson and the 
Plaintiff had no obligation whatsoever to pay a commission to J. G. 
Realty) (Tr. 51, 126, 161, 198; Ex. 18). 
Contrary to the foregoing position, Anderson admitted at trial 
that he never told the Plaintiff that he was no longer going to 
represent him (Tr. 53-54, 107). Contrary to the foreoing position, 
Anderson admitted that he never told the Plaintiff that he had done 
wrong in entering into the Earnest Money Agreement with JCM (Tr. 53). 
Also contrary to the foregoing positon, Anderson admitted that 
despite his disagreement with Gleason over how a sale should be 
handled, there was no hesitation on his part to go ahead on the 
multi-million dollar deal between JCM, himself and United Farm Agency, 
the beginning of which had been executed on a J. G. Realty form 
-8-
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(Tr. 58; Ex. 19) . 
EARNEST MONEY AGREEMENT 
The earnest money agreement signed on July 18, 1978 by the 
Plaintiff and McGarry, as president for JCM, called for the Plain-
tiff to receive $200,000.00 as follows: $40,000.00 cash down; a 
five year 10% note for $38,750.00; the balance to be paid by JCM 
assuming existing loans on the company, building and equipment in 
the amount of $121,250.00 (Ex. 18). The Earnest Money Agreement, 
consistent with the Plaintiff's listing agreement, did not include 
the Plaintiff's accounts receivable or payable in the terms of the 
sale (Ex. 15, 18). 
ANDERSON'S REPRESENTATIONS 
On the evening of July 18 or the following day Anderson told 
the Plaintiff that the buyers were worth seven and one-half million 
dollars. When the buyers, through Anderson, asked the Plaintiff for 
a financial statement, the Plaintiff in turn asked Anderson to check 
into the buyers' financial standing. Anderson agreed to and reported 
back that the buyers were worth 3t million net worth (Tr. 154-155, 
278-279, 282). Anderson at first denied that he had been told by 
the buyers that they were worth millions of dollars (Tr. 67). He 
later admitted that he may have told the Plaintiff that they were 
worth seven million dollars (Tr. 68) and also admitted that "millions" 
had come up in his presence (Tr. 73-74). Although Anderson denied 
that he represented to the Plaintiff that the buyers were financially 
sound (Tr. 68), a local bank manager testifie? that Anderson had 
told him that the buyers were sound (Tr. 289, 396) . Anderson admitted 
that he never made any inquiry into the buyers' financial standing 
(Tr. 105, 109-110, 125). 
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Following July 18, 1978 the Plaintiff continued to meet 
with Anderson on an almost daily basis (Tr. 151, 158). The Plain-
tiff, as with the sales of his motel and home, again told Anderson 
that he expected to receive the $5,000.00 earnest money and Anderson 
said that he would get it for him (Tr. 149-151, ~265-266). 
AUGUST 14, 1978 CLOSING 
On August 14, 1978 Anderson contacted the Plaintiff and told 
him that all of the arrangements for the funding of the purchase of 
his company ahd been worked out, including the $50,000.00 operating 
capital. He asked the Plaintiff to come to his office to finish 
preparing the paperwork necessary for closing the sale (Tr. 161). 
At 3:00 p.m. the Plaintiff met at the United Farm Agency 
office with Anderson, Anderson's wife and secretary, Martha, McGarry 
and Gleason. The parties figured adjustments and prepared a rough 
draft of a closing statement. The closing statement included the 
$200,000.00 sales price, the $20,000.00 commission, and the down 
payment of $40,000.00, among the other items .. Adjustments were 
made to reflect changes in the Plaintiff's inventory since his 
business was listed. The Plaintiff's receivables and payables were 
at this point included in the sale and offset against each other. 
After the receivables, payables, and other adjustments had been 
taken into account, the Plaintiff was entitled to his $40,000.00 
cash down and to an additional $44,000.00 note (rather than the 
$38,750.00 listed in the earnest money agreement (Tr. 163), making 
an agreed equity in the company of $84,000.00 (Tr. 161-162, 197-198, 
305-313). 
The adjustments having been made, Anderson prepared two 
promissory notes to be signed by the Plaintiff, one for $44,000.00, 
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and one for $35,000.00 (Tr. 81~31, 85-86). Anderson also prepared 
several warranty deeds for the Plaintiff's signature (Tr. 83-84, 90, 
93-95). He helped prepare a bill of sale for the Plaintiff's equip-
ment (Tr. 163-164, 237) and he had previously ordered preliminary 
title reports on the Plaintiff's land which were kept in the United 
Farm Agency file (Tr. 416-417; Ex. 20-29). 
WORTHLESS NOTES GIVEN 
The warranty deed and the bill of sale were signed by the 
Plaintiff and the warranty deeds were notorized by Anderson. The 
note for $44,000.00, payable over five years, was signed by James 
C. McGarry as president of JCM Development Company, notorized by 
Anderson and given to the Plaintiff. About an hour later Ander~on 
brought the note for $35,000.00 to the Plaintiff. This note repre-
sented $35,000.00 of the $40,000.00 cash down which was to be paid 
to the Plaintiff at closing. The Plaintiff expressed concern why he 
was receiving a note instead of cash as agreed and the parties told 
him that the money had not yet been wired and requested that he 
wait for this amount and that they would give him the balance of 
$5,000.00 from the earnest money. Anderson assured the Plaintiff 
that his procedure would be safe and encouraged him to accept the 
notes. When the Plaintiff asked Anderson about the need for colla-
teral for the notes, Anderson laughed and told the Plaintiff that 
the notes were "as good as gold" and he would have no problem getting 
paid (Tr. 88, 162-165, 282). 
Relying upon Anderson, the Plaintiff accepted two worthless 
unsecured notes totaling $79,000.00. The Plaintiff surrendered 
$200,00.00 in assets to JCM on an oral promise that JCM would pay 
off his opligations. He turned his checking account and in excess 
of $60.000.00 accounts receivable over to McGarry, assured by 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Anderson that McGarry would use them to pay debts and keep the 
company running (Tr. 171-172, 306). When the Plaintiff received 
the $5,000.00 "earnest money" it was actually $5,000.00 of his own 
receivables (Tr. 171). Despite admitting that the Plaintiff had 
been a good customer, Anderson testified that h~ was not concerned 
about the Plaintiff's welfare on August 14, 1978 (Tr. 118). 
LAWYER NOT USED 
The following morning of August 15, 1978, the Plaintiff asked 
Anderson for a finished closing statement, but never got a satis-
factory response (Tr. 96, 170-171). On the closings of the Plain-
tiff's motel and home, Anderson had gotten the parties together, 
roughed out the closing docume~ts, and then, pursuant to United Farm 
Agency policy, had taken the Plaintiff and the buyers to an attorney 
who finalized the closing. The Plaintiff had expected this to occur 
again and, therefore, kept asking, without success, for the closing 
statement (Tr. 96, 122, 257-264, 284). Anderson did most of the 
negotiating for the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff at all times believed 
that Anderson and United Farm Agency were representing him (T. 144, 
252-255, 264-266, 284). 
PLAINTIFF DEFRAUDED OF HIS ASSETS 
OnceMcGarry and Gleason had the Plaintiff's assets, the sale 
of the Plaintiff's business came to a devastating conclusion. 
McGarry and Gleason immediately skimmed off the Plaintiff's accounts 
receivable and failed to apply them to the operation of the business. 
Unsecured assets were sold or hauled off. Secured assets were re-
possessed or foreclosed upon by creditors. The company's creditors 
and employees were not paid. All of the deals involving McGarry 
and Gleason fell through (Tr. 75, 113-114, 117). 
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The Plaintiff went to the county attorney, the attorney gen-
eral, and private attorneys for help, but received no help. He did 
his own investigation which revealed that the supposedly wealthy 
Mr. McGarry had a tiny office above a little store in Salt Lake 
City, and that J. G. Realty's business address was a bathroom inan 
office building. When he tried to regain his business records a 
gun was pointed in his face and his life threatened. A year Jater, 
after the commencement of this action, he was compelled to file 
bankruptcy (Tr. 176-191, 203, 212, 221). 
JUDGMENT 
The trial court granted the Plaintiff judgment against McGarry, 
Gleason and JCM Development Company for fraud. The court entered 
judgment against Anderson, Clan Stilson (the United Farm Agency 
broker), and United Farm Agency for the reasons set forth in the 
court's ruling at pages 413 to 418 of the transcript, and as set forth 
in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law entered (R. 232-239). 
The court found that fiduciary and other legal duties were 
owed the Plaintiff by Anderson, Stilson and United Farm Agency as a 
result of their prior dealings, their signed listing agreements and 
Utah law (R. 233; Finding No. 9). The court further ruled that the 
duties were not terminated by the parties since they never told the 
Plaintiff that they were no longer representing him and, furthermore, 
continued to do so. The court found that the Plaintiff justifiably, 
and without fault of his own, relied on the parties to protect his 
interests and was entitled to rely on Anderson's representations 
(R. 236; Finding No. 25). Specifically, the court found that the 
following duties were owed to the Plaintiff and were breached by 
Anderson, Stilson and United Farm Agency: 
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1. The duty to deal in honesty, good faith, loyalty and 
with due competence (R. 236; Finding No. 26). 
2. The duty to investigate the financial stability of JCM 
(R. 237; Finding No. 26). 
3. The duty to utilize the services of·an attorney to con-
duct the Plaintiff's closing (R. 237; Finding No. 27). 
4. The duty to prevent the Plaintiff from accepting unsecured 
notes and from partingwith his assets without proper col-
lateral being provided to assure payment (R. 237; Finding 
No. 28.) 
5. The duty to investigate into J. G. Realty's background 
(R. 237; Finding No. 29). 
The court found that the Plaintiff had suffered damages in 
the amount of $185,178.30 and awarded judgment, jointly and sever-
ally, against all parties named except Linda McGarry, for said 
amount. Neither Anderson, McGarry, Gleason, nor JCM has appealed. 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S JUDGMENT AGAINST UNITED FARM 
AGENCY IS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
Robert Anderson had been United Farm Agency's agent since 
1974 and had handled about 20 closings per year for United Farm 
Agency by the time he undertook to sell the Plaintiff's business in 
1978 (Tr. 121, 125). 
United Farm Agency's responsiblity as Anderson's principal 
is set forth in 3 Am Jur 2nd Agency § 267: 
The well-settled general rule is that a 
principal is liable civilly for the tortious 
acts of his agent which are done within the 
course and scope of the agent's employment. 
However, this rule is not grounded on agency 
principles, which is evident from the hold-
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ings that a principal may be held for his agent's 
tort committed in the course and scope of the 
agent's employment even though the principal does 
not authorize, ratify, participate in, or know of, 
such misconduct, or even if he forbade or dis-
approved of the act complained of. 
Fundamentally, and according to both the Re-
statement and the American courts, there is no 
distinction to be drawn between the liability of 
a principal for the tortious act of his agent and 
the liability of a master for the tortious act of 
his servant. In both cases, the tort liability 
is based on the master and servant, rather than 
agency, principal; the liability for the tortious 
act of the employee is grounded upon the maxim of 
"respondeat superior" and is to be determined by 
considering, from a factual standpoint, the ques-
tion whether the tortious act was done while the 
employee, whether agent or.servant, was acting 
within the scope of his employment. (Emphasis added.) 
United Farm Agency, in addition to being Anderson's principal, 
was also the Plaintiff's agent. Under such circumstance, Anderson 
was the Plaintiff's subagent. The Restatement of Agency, Second 
§ 406 states: 
Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is responsible 
to the principal for the conduct of ,a subservant 
or other subagent with reference to the princi-
pal' s affairs entrusted to the subagent, as the 
agent is for his own conduct; and as to other 
matters, as a principal is for the conduct of a. 
servant or other agent. 
Comment·b. of § 406 states: 
An agent who employs a subagent is the latter's 
principal and is responsible . . to his princi-
pal for the subagent's derelictious. Thus, the 
agent is subject to liability to the principal 
for harm to the principal's property or business 
caused by the subagent's negligence or other 
wrong to the principal's interest ... 3 
3Two of the illustrations of § 406 concern real estate agents: 
1. P employes A, a real estate agent, to sell Blackacre for 
him. A entrusts the transaction to B, one of his employees. With-
out A's knowledge, B misprepresents to T, a prospective purchaser, 
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The facts herein clearly show that Anderson was acting with-
in the scope of his employment as agent for United Farm Agency 
when he listed, advertised,. found a buyer for· and caused the loss 
of the Plaintiff's property, that Anderson, as subagent, was en-
trusted to handle the sale of the Plaintiff's business, and that 
Anderson caused the Plaintiff's loss while acting under his entrust-
ed authority. The facts further show that United Farm Agency itself 
was involved in the sale and not just Anderson. 
Contrary to the Defendant's argument, the issue herein in-
valved does not begin with Anderson's deplorable (mis)representation 
of the Plaintiff in July and August of 1978. The issue commences 
with the United Farm Agency listing agreement which was signed each 
time the Plaintiff listed his motel, his office building, his home, 
and his business. The same listing agreement form was signed by 
Robert Anderson as a United Farm Agency local representative on 
each property listed (Ex. 2, 3, 5, 6, 14, 15). The form had no place 
for the United Farm Agency broker, Clan Stilson, to sign. Instead, 
it said, "IMPORTANT TO OUR LOCAL REPRESENTATIVE: Be sure this 
agreement is filled out as fully as possible ... ", clearly showing 
that Mr. Stilson's signature as broker was not required by company 
policy and that Anderson was authortized and entrusted to act for 
the company on his own. Most significantly, the form contained the 
the condition of the premises, and for this misrepresentation P is 
subject to liability to T. A is subject to liability to P for the 
loss to P caused by B's conduct. 
2. Same facts as in Illustration 1, except that Bis bribed 
by T to sell Blackacre at a low price. A is subject to liability 
to P for the loss P thereby caused, but not for the amount of the 
bribe received by B unless it comes to A's hands. 
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printed signature of Norman McCain, president of United Farm 
Agency. Under Utah law a corporation that engages in the sale of 
real estate for a fee is a "real estate broker". Utah Code Anno-
tated, 1953, as amended, §61-2-2; Diversified General Corporation 
v. White Barn Golf Course, Inc., Utah, 584 P.2d 848 (1978). There-
fore, the listing agreement form was signed by United Farm Agency 
as a broker. 
The United Farm listing agreement form, signed each time by 
the parties, contained "A Personal Message From Our President", 
which included such assurances as: "Thank you for entrusting us 
with the sale of your property. We will do our best to warrant 
your faith", and, "We will do our best to serve you". 
The Plaintiff signed this United Farm Agency form when he 
listed his motel and office building (Ex. 2, 3; Tr. 9-11). The 
motel and office building were advertised and sold through United 
Farm Agency's national catalogue and by use of financing provided 
by United Farm Agency's subsidiary, RLC. Anderson and United Farm 
Agency split a $20,000.00 commission which was paid by the Plain-
tiff. United Farm Agency never disputed that Anderson was its 
agent and acting for it when the Plaintiff's motel and office 
building were listed, advertised and sold (Tr. 19~23). 
On January 28, 1978, the Plaintiff listed his home and con-
struction business together. The business and home were also 
listed separately but on the same United Farm Agency form each time 
(Ex. 5, 6; Tr. 13-16). The home was advertised and sold through 
United Farm Agency's national catalogue and United Farm Agency and 
- Anderson split a $4,500.00 commission (Tr. 24-25). Again, United 
Farm Agency did not dispute that Anderson was acting as its agent. 
-17-Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
The construction business was also advertised in United 
Farm Agencys'inational catalogue, clearly proving that United Farm 
Agency approved of Anderson's undertaking on its behalf to sell 
the property (Tr. 16-17). Anderson delivered JCM to the Plaintiff 
as a prospectj_ve buyer, fully expecting a commission on July 17, 
1978, a date within two months of the dates that both the motel 
and home closings had occurred (Tr. 36-41). At trial Anderson, 
Stilson and United Farm Agency contended that they ceased to repre-
sent the Plaintiff after Anderson, out of the presence of the Plain-
tiff, agreed to let Gleason handle the sale. However, neither 
Anderson, nor United Farm Agency, nor Stilson, nor anyone else, 
ever told the Plaintiff that he was no longer being represented by 
them or that no commission was to be received by United Farm Agency 
(Tr. 53-54, 107, 414). To the contrary, Anderson told the Plain-
tiff that he was to receive a commission, and a $20,000.00 commission 
appeared on the closing statement prepared on August 14, 1978 (Tr. 44, 
51, 126, 145-146, 161, 198). Anderson also prepared closing docu-
ments ,including deeds and notes (Tr. 80-94; Ex. 20-29). 
Despite the foregoing facts, United Farm Agency contends that 
it had no responsiblity for the Plaintiff's loss and relies upon 
Wilkerson v. Stevens, 16 Utah 2d 424, 403 P2d 32 (1965) to support 
its position. However, Wilkerson can be readily distinguished. 
In Wilkerson, the wronged Plaintiff had dealt solely with a real 
estate agent and did not even know that the agent had a broker 
until afer he had instituted suit. The court found that: (1) no 
documents with the broker's name were used; (2) there wa~ no re-
liance on the broker; (3) the broker did not anticipate receiving 
a commission; and ( 4) the broker simply did not participate in the 
sale. The evidence in the instant case SL~.-_;,, _____ . --- ·~-~ _. 
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clusion on each point. 
(1) In the Plaintiff's case, United Farm Agency documents 
were used to list the Plaintiff's construction business, or parts 
thereof, three times (Ex. 6, 14, 15). While United Farm Agency's 
forms were not used for the earnest money agreement-, it was 
because, as is customary between participating brokers, a commis-
sion split had been arranged between United Farm Agency and J. G. 
Realty and because Gleason persuaded Anderson to let him handle the 
sale in return for millions in sales that United Farm would handle 
down the road ·(Tr. 44-48, 69, 145-146). 
(2) The court specifically found that the Plaintiff relied 
on United Farm and had the right to do so by virtue of the terms 
of the listing agreement, United Farm Agency's duties under Utah 
real estate law, and United Farm Agency's fiduciary duties arising 
from the agent-principal relationship (R. 233; Finding No. 9;.Tr. 414). 
The listing agreement contained a warranty that United Farm Agency 
would act in good faith and do its best to serve the Plaintiff. 
The Plaintiff testified that his was a United Farm Agency deal and 
that he was relying on both Anderson and United Farm Agency: 
Q: (By Mr. Snow) Now, you indicated here that you expected 
me to close this transaction; did you not? 
A: I did. 
Q: Well, now, when did you come and talk to me about this 
transaction? 
A: I didn't. 
Q: You didn't. Well, if you never talked to me about it, why 
would you have expected to have it closed in my office? 
A: Because all of United Farm's deals were being handled 
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through you and this was a United Farm deal and I expected 
to go to your office and close. 
Q: But his was not a United Farm deal, this was a J. G. Realty 
deal? 
MR. MORTENSEN: Objection, your Honor. He's not asking a 
question. He's just arguing with the witness. 
THE COURT: Objection sustained. That's not a question, when 
you say this is not, you see. That's argumentative. 
Q: (By Mr. Snow) All right. Well, now, when you asked Mr. 
Anderson -- you said you asked him on this $5000, and that 
would have been on the 19th? 
A: Yes. 
Q: Why didn't you ask J. G. Realty for It, Gleason? 
A: They weren't representing me. Bob Anderson was my repre-
sentative. 
Q: Well, why did you do it with that other realty company then? 
A: I didn't. 
Q: Oh, you didn't? 
A: No. I was making an earnest money agreement with the par-
ties in the office, Mr. Anderson and McGarry and myself. 
And when Mr. Gleason made this statement: "Shall we use 
your form or my form,'' it didn't make any difference who 
was handling the deal. I was still working through United 
Farm. (Tr. 264-265) 
(Emphasis added.) 
(3) In, this case, United Farm Agency clearly anticipated re-
ceiving a commission. The property was listed several times on its 
listing agreement form. United Farm Agency advertised the property 
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for sale in its national catalogue and Anderson introduced JCM, 
expecting to receive a commission. The $20,000.00, ten percent, 
commission appeared on the closing statement prepared by the par-
ties on August 14, 1978 (Tr. 161). Only United Farm Agency was en-
titled to the commission since only United Farm Agency had a list-
ing agreement with the Plaintiff and no commission was included on 
the J. G. Realty Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 18, line 49). The 
reason that Anderson never told the Plaintiff ·he was no longer 
representing him was that he continued to represent the Plaintiff 
and continued to expect a commission to and beyond August 14, 1978. 
(4) United Farm Agency not only participated in the sale of 
the Plaintiff's business as shown above, but United Farm Agency also 
participated in the purchase of the Plaintiff's business as well. 
United Farm Agency and McGarry intended to use the Plaintiff's con-
struction business to develop a mobile home park in which each was 
to benefit financially. 
United Farm Agency and Anderson, by an Earnest Money Agree-
ment dated July 18, 1978, agreed to sell to JCM 20 acres of land 
located south of Moab for $100,000.00. The land had been taken by 
United Farm Agency and Anderson as a commission from a prior sale and 
each owned an undivided one-half of the property. The 20 acres 
and surrounding property to be purchased by JCM were to be devel-
opened into a mobile home subdivision with United Farm Agency to have 
the exclusive right to sell over two million dollars in lots for 
a ten percent commission on sales made (or a potential $200,000.00). 
United Farm Agency was also to provide financing for the purchase 
of the lots. At trial United Farm Agency did not disclaim know-
ledge of this and could not because a public announcement of its 
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deal with JCM had appeared in the Moab Times-Independent newspaper 
(Tr. 60-69). 
Immediately after the Plaintiff turned his company over to 
the crooks the newspaper article had appeared announcing that United 
Farm Agency would sell and finance the lots at $12,~00.00 each and 
that Phillips Construction Company, recently purchased by JCM, 
would be the contractor (T. 64-66, 110). The whole United Farm 
Agency-JCM deal had hinged upon the purchase by JCM of the Plain-
tiff's business and this dramatic conflict of interest on the part 
of United Farm Agency directly contributed to the Plaintiff's loss. 
To this point it has been shown that Anderson was clearly 
acting as agent for United Farm Agency when he caused the Plaintiff's 
loss and that United Farm Agency clearly was itself participating 
in the sale and loss of the Plaintiff's business. Despite such 
clear evidence that United Farm Agency knew or should have known 
that Anderson was mishandling the Plaintiff's sale (see Wells v. 
Walker Bank and Trust Co., Utah, 590 P2d 1261 (1979), United Farm 
Agency, for the first time on appeal, attempts to feign ignorance 
of Anderson's actions on its behalf. However, in so doing United 
Farm Agency proves that it is culpable even if it did' not know 
what Anderson was doing. At page 16 of its brief United Farm Ag~ncy 
states: 
In fact, aside from setting out its policies 
and procedures as to how a proper transaction 
should be handled for United Farm Agency, there 
was no supervision at all of Anderson's activi-
ties and conduct." (Emphasis added.) 
\ 
This incredible admission establishes in and of itself United Farm 
Agency's and Clan Stilson's liability for the Plaintiff's loss. 
Such failure to supervise is p~r se negligence on the part of United 
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ei 
Farm Agency and Stilson as brokers under Utah law and as such is 
cause for revocation of their right to sell real estate pursuant 
to Section 61-2-11(14) of the Utah Code Annotated, which states 
that a broker's license may be suspended or revoked for "failing 
to exercise reasonable supervision over the activities of his 
licensees." 
The record overwhelmingly supports the trial court's finding 
that United Farm Agency and Clan Stilson are liable for the Plain-
tiff's loss. Anderson was their agent and acted in his entrusted 
capacity as agent at all times. United Farm Agency itself under-
took to represent the Plaintiff when it accepted Anderson's list-
ing of the Plaintiff's business and advertised the Plaintiff's 
business in its national catalogue. United Farm Agency, as a real 
estate broker, owed the Plaintiff the obligation to deal with the 
Plaintiff with high standards of "honesty, integrity, truthfulnes~, 
reputation, and competancy". Dugan v. Jones, Utah, 615 P2d 1239 
<1980); Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, §61-2-6(a). The 
record is replete with proof that those standards were not met. 
The only dispute in the record is whether United Farm Agency uni-
laterally abandoned the Plaintiff without advising him that he was 
4 
on his. own , or whether United Farm Agency, through Anderson, con-
tinued to represent the Plaintiff through the time he was defrauded. 
4
rn relation to United Farm Agency's claimed unilateral 
abandonment of the Plaintiff, the Court is referred to Disciplinary 
Rule 2-110 ( 2), which states that a lawyer shall not withdraw from 
employment until he has taken reasonable steps to avoid foresee-
able prejudice to the rights of his client, including giving due 
notice to his client. A real estate broker should have no less a 
duty. Dugan v. Jones, supra. 
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Either way, United Farm breached its contractual, professional, 
fiduciary, and codified duties to the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff 
as a result was defrauded of his business. 
POINT II 
THE PLAINTIFF WAS NEVER PAID FOR OVE'I1 
$185,000.00 IN ASSETS BECAUSE OF UNITED 
FARM AGENCY'S NEGLIGENCE AND BREACHES OF 
DUTIES 
A broker is liable to his principal for all damages which 
flow naturally from his misconduct and which are a direct conse-
quence thereof. 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §96. The uncontroverted 
evidence shows that the Plaintiff lost over $260,000.00 in assets~ 
as a result of the misconduct of United Farm. The uncontroverted 
evidence further shows that he was never paid for over $185,000.00 
worth of assets (R. 236; Findings No. 22-25). 
It must be understood that the Plaintiff's company con-
tained over $200,000.00 in assets exclusive of the Plaintiff's 
accounts receivable. The construction company, as listed for sale, 
included only a shop and office building (with storage rental units), 
all equipment for building construction, franchise, and equipment 
for metal buildings (Ex. 5, 6, 8, 15; Tr. 13-15, 28). The Plain-
tiff's accounts receivable were not included in the listings and 
and were not included in the assets listed in the Earnest Money 
Agreement of July 18, 1978 which contained the $200,000.00 sales 
price (Ex. 18). 
The Plaintiff testified that aboti~ $125,000.00 in equip-
ment and inventory was sold to JCM. Defendant's Exhibit 45 is a 
partial inventory and was ref erred to as a partial inventory in 
the Earnest Money Agreement (Ex. 18; Tr. 299-301). That partial 
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inventory listed over $92,000.00 in assets which were sold. In 
addition to the items on the inventory, the Plaintiff also sold a 
950 cat loader valued at about $15,000.00 and metal buildings 
valued at over $30,000.00 (Tr. 226-227, 301). He also sold his 
shop building and an additional lot. The shop building alone had 
been listed at $70,000.00 (Ex. 14). The combined value of these 
assets, therefore, equalled, if not exceeded, $200,000.00 before 
the Plaintiff's accounts receivable came to be included in the 
sale on· August 14, 1978. At, or before, the closing, the Defen-
dants persuaded the Plaintiff to include his accounts receivable 
of about $62,000 into the sale. These were to be "offset" by JCM 
agreeing to pay over $30,000.00 in accounts payable owed by the 
Plaintiff and by JCM agreeing to pay off loans to which certain of 
the accounts receivable had been pledged (Tr. 305-306, 312, 314-
315). The effect of this "offset" was to include over $60,000.00 
additional assets into the sale but to leave the purchase price at 
$200,000.00 on paper. 
At trial the Plaintiff did not try to recover the full 
$260,000.00 -plus value of his lost assets since some debts 
had been paid (a small portion by JCM; a larger portion by pro-
ceeds from foreclosure sales) (Tr. 206, 210-211). The Plaintiff 
instead offered proof to show how much of that value had not been 
paid. His uncontroverted testimony showed that he had not been 
paid any part of the $79,000.00 equity represented by the two notes 
($44,000.00 and $35,000.00 respectively). His uncontroverted tes-
timony further proved that obligations totaling over $106,000.00 
were not paid by JCM as agreed (R. 236, Findings No. 22-25; Tr. 
197-235, 317). 
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Therefore, the Plaintiff was defrauded of over $185,000.00 
in assets for which he was never paid. The unpaid debts and 
worthless notes are the measure of the Plaintiff's loss of assets. 
Points II and III of United Farm Agency's brief do not allege that 
the Plaintiff was not defrauded or that JCM was not to have paid 
the debts testified to by the Plaintiff. United Farm Agency's 
contentions regarding the Statute of Frauds and capacity to sue 
are red herrings which detract from the fact that the Plaintiff 
was tjefrauded because of United Farm Agency's negligence and 
breaches of fiduciary duties. All of United Farm Agency's conten-
tions are smokescreens to hide the fact that it was negligent when 
it encouraged the Plaintiff to part with over $260,000.00 in assets 
without receiving collateral, a written assumption agreement, a 
closing statement and other necessary legal protection. Morely v. 
J. Pagel Realty & Insurance, 27 Ariz. App. 62, 550 P.2d 1104 (1976). 
POINT II(A) 
THE PLAINTIFF HAD CAPACITY TO SUE BECAUSE HE 
OWNED THE ASSETS OF WHICH HE WAS DEFRAUDED AND 
WAS PERSONALLY LIABLE FOR THE DEBTS WHICH WERE 
ASSUMED BUT NOT PAID. ALSO, THE LAW DOES NOT 
REQUIRE THAT THE TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY BE SUB-
STITUTED AS THE PLAINTIFF IN A PENDING ACTION. 
The evidence clearly shows that the Plaintiff had capacity 
to sue for his damages. It was the Plaintiff who was wronged, not 
the corporation. 
First, all assets sold to JCM were owned by the Plaintiff 
personally (Tr. 218; Ex. 20, 21, 26, 28, 29). 
Second, the obligations which were to be paid by JCM were the 
personal primary obligations of the Plaintiff and not obligations 
of the corporation. The Plaintiff did business personally as 
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Phillips Construction Company at all times. He had in early 1978, 
upon the advice of an attorney, formed a corporation which was 
called Phillips Construction Company, Inc. The attorney's plan 
called for the Plaintiff to maintain ownership of all equipment 
and property and to lease them to the corporation (Tr. 132, 207). 
Business was intended to be carried on through the corporation, 
however, the corporation ''had just been formed and was not fully 
going" and no assets were ever conveyed to the corporation (Tr. 218). 
The Plaintiff testified that no obligations were ever incurred 
through the corporation's name but that all were incurred in the 
Plaintiff's name personally: 
THE COURT: Mr. Mortensen, I thought he testified he did 
business in the name of the corporation, but 
he owned all the property and equipment and 
stuff was in his name personally. 
THE WITNESS: That was the intent. 
THE COURT: All right. You have a bill to somebody like 
Riverside Accoustics. Now, was that to order 
material doing business as? 
THE WITNESS: I did not order these materials as Phillips 
Construction Company, Inc. I ordered all 
material as Phillips Construction Company, 
Rodney L. Phillips, doing business as 
Phillips Construction Company. The people 
are not going to supply a corporation unless 
credit is established for that corporation. 
And all the accounts that I had prior to the 
sale of this business, all those accounts 
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were continuting accounts over the past years 
of doing business as Rodney L. Phillips doing 
business as Phillips Construction Company. 
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. (Tr. 219). 
The Plaintiff testified that each obligation was his and the court 
accepted his testimony as true (Tr. 197-235). Exhibits 34, 36, 38, 
39 and 40 all show that obligations, including taxes, were incurred 
personally by the Plaintiff doing business as Phillips Construction 
Company. A bank manager's testimony confirmed the same (Tr. 394). 
The inclusion of the corporation stock in the sale was a 
clean up matter and purely incidental to the main sale. The pro-
vision for the sale of 100% of the stock in Phillips Construction 
Company was added to the Earnest Money Agreement and initialled by 
the Plaintiff as an afterthought (see line 7 of Exhibit 18). Both 
Anderson and the Plaintiff testifed that a stock transfer would 
not properly transfer the Plaintiff's assets (Tr. 43, 170-171). 
No conflicting evidence or testimony was ever offered by any Defen-
dant to show that any of the obligations were corporation rather 
than personal debt, or that any of the assets belonged to the cor-
poration rather than to the Plaintiff. 
While United Farm Agency alleges that there is no evidence 
that the Plaintiff has suffered as a result of JCM's failure to 
pay the obligations and, therefore, the Plaintiff has no cause of 
action; the evidence, from start to finish, says otherwise (Tr. 197-
234; Ex. 34, 36, 38, 29, 40). The Plaintiff testified repeatedly 
at trial (three years after the July 1978 sale) that the obligations 
had never been paid and that he was being held responsible by his 
creditors. Perhaps the most succinct statement occurred during the 
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Plaintiff's testimony at this point: 
Q. (By Mr. Mortensen) For the record, Mr. Phillips, 
on any of the matters we're going to be bringing before 
the Court, have you made any payments towards satisfying 
them? 
A. No. Because of my transactions with Bob Anderson, 
I was forced into bankruptcy and I haven't had any -- a 
penny to pay any of it (Tr. 212). 
Third, although the Plaintiff filed bankruptcy, no rule of 
law required that the trustee in bankruptcy be substituted as the 
Plaintiff in the action. Bankruptcy Rule 610, states: 
The trustee or receiver may, with or without court 
approval, prosecute or enter his appearance and defend 
any pending action or proceeding by or against the 
bankrupt, or commence and prosecute any action or pro-
ceeding in behalf of the estate, before any tribunal. 
(Emphasis added.) 
Rule 610 clearly states that a trustee's appearance is discretionary 
in a pending action which was instituted prior to the bankruptcy 
petition being filed. Without trustee intervention the debtor can 
continue the litigation and, if successful, the fruits of the 
litigation will inure to the benefit of the trustee. The trustee 
in turn is bound by any judgment rendered. See 9 Am Jur 2d, 
Bankruptcy, §157 and authorites cited therein. 
Further, this issue is raised as a defense for the first time 
on appeal. The Defendant knew of the Plaintiff's bankruptcy prior 
to trial and never raised the issue even though it was brought to 
the court's attention during the pretrial conference held on 
5 August 4, 1980. Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a)(l) states that 
5A transcript of the pretrial conference is to be filed pur-
suant to order of this Court dated May 17, 1982. 
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if a defendant desires to raise the issue of capacity he must do so 
by a specific negative averment. The Defendants never alleged a 
lack of capacity and thereby waived the defense, assuming, arguendo, 
that lack of capacity could be a defense in this matter. 
Finally, even if this Court should conclude that the trustee 
is a necessary party plaintiff, the proper way to remedy the matter 
is not by a reversal, but by a simple order.joining the trustee as 
a plaintiff pursuant to URCP 21, which states in applicable part: 
Misjoinder of parties is not ground for dismis-
sal of an action. Parties may be dropped or added 
by order of the court on motion of any party or its 
own initiative at any stage of the action and on 
such terms as are just. (Emphasis added.) 
Pursuant to Rule 21, parties may be added even after trial has 
been completed~ Harris-Dudley Plumbi~g Company v~ Professional United 
World :Travel Association (WTA), ·Inc:, Utah, 529 P2d 586 ( 1979). 6 This 
Court may rest assured that the Plaintiff's trustee in bankruptcy 
has known of this action and that he is willing upon request 
be joined as a party plaintiff. Up to the point of appeal the De-
fendants simply did not request the trustee's joinder despite the 
Plaintiff's offer to do so at the pretrial. 
POINT II(B) 
THE DEFENSE OF THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS rs UNAVAIL-
ABLE TO UNITED FARM AGENCY BECAUSE NO AFFIRMATIVE 
PLEADING OR OBJECTION RESERVED THE RIGHT TO RAISE 
THE ISSUE ON APPEAL AND FURTHER BECAUSE THE DE-
FENSE COULD NOT BE AVAILABLE TO UNITED FARM AGENCY 
IN ANY EVENT. 
The affirmative defense of the Statute of Frauds is raised 
6This Court in this very action has approved the post trial 
addition of a party defendant. The March 1, 1982 ruling denied a 
motion by the party added to quash Rule 71B service. See also Shirley 
v. Venaglia, 86 N.M. 721, 527 P2d 316 (1974); Smith v. Castlemen, 
81, N.M. 1, 462 P2d 135 (1969). 
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for the first time on appeal. As conceded by United Farm Agency in 
its brief, the defense was never plead. Since the ~efense was not 
plead it was waived under Rules 8(c) and 12(h) of the Utah Rules of 
Civil Procedure. Bezner v. Continental Dry Cleaners, Inc., Utah, 548 
P2d 898 (1976). Additionally, the Statute of Frauds was not raised 
at trial. Rule 4 of the Utah Rules of Evidence states that no ver-
dict or finding shall be set aside, nor decision based thereon be re-
versed, by reason of the erroneous admission of evidence unless there 
is a timely objection which sets forth the specific ground of objec-
tion and the matter is ruled upon by the Court. No objection relat-
ing to the Statute of Frauds was ever voiced by the Defendants and 
ruled on by the trial court. Therefore, the Statute of Frauds cannot 
now be raised to attack the evidence received by the trial court. 
Despite the foregoing, United Farm Agency now claims that it 
didn't need to plead the Statute of Frauds because the Plaintiff 
did not plead special damages. The answer to this is that, assuming 
that the Plaintiff's damages constituted special damages (which 
they did not), the Defendants should have objected if they were sur-
prised. They did not object because they were not surprised. They 
were not surprised because they were forwarned that the Plaintiff 
was going to measure his loss of assets by the amount he had not 
been paid for them by JCM as agreed. They were forewarned by 
Point V (pages 12-13) of the Plaintiff's pretrial Memorandum dated 
July 9, 1981, that the Plaintiff was going to so contend (R.159-161). 
In that memorandum the Plaintiff clearly stated that he was entitled 
to the value of his unpaid notes plus the balance owed on all un-
paid obligations. 
The Plaintiff testified that he had not been paid any amount 
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toward his notes totalling $79,000.00. He testified that JCM was 
) 
to have paid off over $106,000.00 in debt as part of the purchase 
price, but failed to do so. He testified that Robert Anderson was 
present and participated in the closing on August 14, 1978. Ander-
son did not dispute that he was present, nor did he dispute that 
any of the obligations cited by the Plaintiff were to be paid byJCM 
. -7 (Tr. 254, 317). No witness for United Farm Agency claimed that the 
Plaintiff had received any payments on his notes nor that the Plain-
tiff's obligations had been paid. Therefore, the court was abso-
lutely justified in finding that the Plaintiff had been damaged in 
the amount of $186,000.00, the ~mount he had not been paid for assets 
of which he· was defrauded. 
Because the Plaintiff's testimony regarding unpaid debt went 
to establish the value of his assets for which he had not been paid, 
the Statute of Frauds is irrelevant. The Plaintiff did not seek to 
enforce an agreement whereby United Farm Agency had promised to 
answer for his debt. The Plaintiff sought to recover damages re-
sulting from United Farm Agency's failure to discharge its duties 
to him as found by the trial court. 12 Am Jur 2d, Brokers, §96. 
In Points II and III of its brief, United Farm Agency incred-
ibly seeks to use its own negligence to prevent the Plaintiff from 
recovering his damages. Both points emphasize that the Plaintiff 
did not receive a final written contract which obligated JCM to pay 
7The fact that the Plaintiff's payables became part of the 
sale despite not being part of the Earnest Money Agreement is not 
remarkable. As has been shown, the parties clearly departed from 
the terms of the Earnest Money Agreement at the closing. The 
Plaintiff's receivables, as well as the payables, were included in 
the sale. The Plaintiff received a note for $44,000.00 instead of a 
note for $38,750.00. The Plaintiff received a note for $35,000.00 
and $5,000.00 cash instead of the $40,000.00 cash down. 
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off his debts. Both points ignore the trial court's findings that 
the failure of the Plaintiff to have a proper and legal closing 
was the fault of United Farm Agency, since by United Farm Agency 
policy a lawyer should have been used to close the matter (Tr. 122, 
415; R. 236; Finding 27). 
United Farm Agency cannot be allowed to escape liability be-
cause of its own negligence. The evidence clearly shows that in 
July, 1981, three years after the sale, the Plaintiff still had not 
been paid the value of his notes and his creditors had still not 
been paid, forcing the Plaintiff into bankruptcy. Before the Plain-
tiff listed his business with United Farm Agency, the Plaintiff had 
over $260,000.00 in assets and around $175,000.00 in liabilities. 
After the Plaintiff listed his business with United Farm Agency he 
had no assets, $106,000.00 in liabilities, and two worthless notes. 
POINT III 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE TO SUSTAIN 
THE JUDGMENT AGAINST ROBERT ANDERSON FOR 
BREACHES OF DUTIES OWED TO THE PLAINTIFF. 
Robert Anderson has not appealed from the judgment and find-
ings of the trial court. However, United Farm Agency, neverthe-
less, contends that there was insufficient evidence to support the 
court's findings and judgment against Anderson. 
The court found that at least five duties were owed to the 
Plaintiff and breached by Anderson (R. 236-237; Findings No. 25-29). 
First, the court found that by abandoning the Plaintiff without 
advising him that he was on his own, Anderson breached his duties· 
of good faith, loyalty and due competence, and that the Plaintiff 
was justified in relying on Anderson since he had never been told 
that he should not do so. Anderson admitted that he never told 
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the Plaintiff he was not going to represent him (Tr. 107). On 
August 14, 1978, Anderson never expressed any concern about the 
manner of the closing although he knew things weren't being done 
as they should (Tr. 118). He prepared and notarized notes and 
deeds at the closing and allowed the Plaintiff to take unsecured 
notes and otherwise part with his assets without receiving· collat-
eral (Tr. 81-88). Anderson testified that although the Plaintiff 
had been a good customer in the past, he was not concerned about 
his welfare because, "I wasn',t involved" (Tr. 118). 
While Anderson claimed to have expressed concern to the 
Plaintiff on July 18, 1978, about how the sale was to be handled, 
the Plaintiff denied that any concern was ever expressed in his 
presence, and Anderson admitted that the Plaintiff may not have been 
.present when he told Gleason that the sale should not be handled 
as a stock transfer (Tr. 47, 256). Anderson also admitted that he 
never told the Plaintiff that he had done wrong in entering into 
the Earnest Money Agreement (Tr. 53). He testified that he washed 
his hands of the Plaintiff because Gleason had promised him millions 
of dollars in future sales (Tr. 48, 69). 
The listing agreement did reserve the Plaintiff's right to 
sell the business himself (Ex. 15). However, the Plaintiff had 
also reserved the right to sell his office building himself (Ex. 3). 
Anderson found a buyer for the office building and the motel and 
received one-half of United Farm Agency's $20,000.00 commission. 
Neither Anderson nor United Farm Agency at that time claimed that 
the Plaintiff had sold the office building and motel himself. It 
was Anderson who introduced McGarry and Gleason to the Plaintiff on 
July 17, 1978. The Plaintiff testified that after July 18, 1978 
and prior to the August 14, 1978 closing, 
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an almost daily basis and that he believed that the sale of his 
business was going to be handled like his other sales had been by 
Anderson and United Farm Agency (Tr. 151, 158, 165). He was told 
that there was to be a commission split between United Farm Agency and 
J. G. Realty, anda commission appeared on the draft of the closing 
statement (Tr. 44, 145-146, 161). 
Anderson omitted to advise the Plaintiff of other important 
facts. Anderson admitted that he never told the Plaintiff about 
his $25,000.00 note which was in default and which was secured by 
the 20 acres which Anderson and United Farm Agency were selling 
to JCM (Tr. 117). 8 When he was informed at or near the end of 
August, 1978, that there were "flags sticking up" on the deal, 
Anderson also omitted to advise the Plaintiff that problems were 
developing regarding his sale (Tr. 100-102, 116). 
The foregoing conduct by Anderson can only be described as 
being in bad faith, dishonest, disloyal and incompetent. Additional 
improper conduct by Anderson will be discussed in relation to the 
court's other findings. 
In Finding No. 27 the court found that Anderson had a duty to 
assure that a legally proper closing occur and that in not utilizing 
the services of an attorney, Anderson breached said duty. Anderson 
testified that United Farm Agency policy required that he use an 
attorney to close his sales (Tr. 122). On prior sales Anderson had 
prepared closing documents and then had taken the Plaintiff to an 
attorney who finished the closings. The Plaintiff expected this to 
occur again and asked Anderson for a closing state~ent on August 15, 
8 See Footnote No. 2, supra. 
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1978. However, Anderson told the Plaitniff that a closing state-
ment wasn't necessary and never did provide one to the Plaintiff 
despite repeated requests by the Plaintiff (Tr. 96, 122, 257-264, 
284). By failing to use a~ attorney, Anderson caused the Plaintiff 
to part with his assets without receiving collateral and a signed 
agreement requiring JCM to pay off the Plaintiff's obligations 
(Tr. 415). Morely v. J. Pagel Realty & Insurance, supra. 
In Finding No. 26, the court found that Anderson had a duty 
to investigate the solvency of JCM and breached said duty. The 
court.further found that the Plaintiff was justified in not making 
his own investigation because of assurances made by Anderson (R. 237; 
Finding No. 26). The Plaintiff testified that Anderson told him 
on July 17 that "money was no problem with these people" (Tr. 139-
140); tha~ the buyers were worth seven and one-half million dollars 
(Tr. 153); that on or about July 19, 1978, he specifically asked 
Anderson to check into the buyer's solvency and that Anderson there-
after reported back that the buyers were worth three and one-half 
million net worth (Tr. 154); and that on August 14, 1978 Anderson 
had assured him while standing over his shoulder, that collateral 
wasn't necessary and that the unsecured notes he was receiving were 
as "good as gold" (Tr. 88, 164, 282-283). The Plaintiff and a Moab 
bank manager both testified that Anderson had told bank personel 
that the buyers were financially sound (Tr. 289, 396). In light of 
the foregoing, there clearly was substantiated evidence to support 
a finding that Anderson had a duty to investigate the buyer's solv-
ency. Anderson admitted that he made no investigation and thereby 
breached his duty (Tr. 105, 109-110, 415)~ The Plaintiff testified 
that he had complete trust in Anderson and the court found the 
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Plaintiff's reliance to be justified, particularly since Anderson 
never told the Plaintiff that he was not representing him (Tr. 165, 
282-283, 417). The foregoing representations were made by Anderson 
as a licensed real estate agent and no independent investigation 
by the Plaintiff was required by law. Smith v: Carroll Realty 
Company, 8 Utah 2d 356, 335 P2d 67 (1959); Dugan v. Jones, supra. 
In Finding No. 38 the court fciund that Anderson had a duty 
to prevent the Plaintiff from accepting unsecured notes and from 
parting with his assets without proper collateral being provided to 
assure payment, andthat by preparing unsecured notes and allowing 
the Plaintiff to part with his assets without collateral Anderson 
breached said duty. This Finding is related to prior findings 
already discussed and will not be further elaborated upon except to 
note again that Anderson did not merely permit the Plaintiff to 
give away his property. To the contrary, Anderson prepared the 
documents and encouraged the Plaintiff to sign the deeds and accept 
the worthless note while standing over his shoulder and assuring 
him that collateral was not necessary (Tr. 282-283). 
In Finding No. 29 the court found that Anderson had the duty 
to investigate into who J. G. Realty was. This duty is supported 
by Anderson's assurances to the Plaintiff that the $5,000.00 
earnest money would be properly held in trust by Gleason and that 
the Plaintiff did not need to worry about receiving it (Tr. 149-152). 
In Fact, the Plaintiff did need to worry since $5,000.00 was never 
placed in the J. G. Realty trust account and the Plaintiff was 
actually paid the $5,000.00 with his own money (Tr. 171). 
The record is replete with evidence to support the court's 
findings. However, rather than restate what has already been set 
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forth, the Court is respectfully referred to the Statement of Facts 
for further information. The trial court's findings and judgment 
are supported by substantial evidence and, therefore, should be 
accepted and upheld by this Court. Hutcheson v. Gleave, Utah, 632 
P2d 815 (1981). 
CONCLUSION 
The findings and judgment of the trial court are supported 
by substantial evidence and no prejudicial error of law occurred 
during the course of .the trial. Therefore, the Plaintiff's judg-
ment against United Farm Agency, a Utah corporation, should be 
affirmed in all respects. 
Respectfully submitted this g ~day of @~ 
;pr ' 1982. 
~~~~~ 
PAUL W. MORTENSEN 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent 
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